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Using linked employer-employee data from the Canadian Workplace and Employee 
Survey 1999-2004, we provide new evidence on how the cost of absence affects labor 
supply decisions. We use a particular feature of the data by which total absences are 
divided into three separate categories: sick paid days, other paid days and unpaid days. 
This division introduces variations in the way workers are compensated for absence (the 
cost of absence) and allows us to estimate more precisely how variations in such costs 
affect absenteeism decisions. We find an absence elasticity of -0.37. We also find 
unobserved heterogeneity to play different roles for workers and workplaces: some 
workers are more frequently absent whatever the reason, but paid and unpaid leaves 
are negatively correlated at the workplace level. 
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 1 Introduction
Most measures of absenteeism show that it has risen in recent years.1 There
are also reasons to believe that the cost of absenteeism is increasing for ￿rms,
especially as they rely increasingly on teamwork as a form of work organization.2
Therefore, a major focus of the literature on the determinants of absenteeism is
to ￿nd what proportion of absences could be avoided and what tools ￿rms can
use to prevent absenteeism. To do this, most authors attempt to measure the
cost of absences and then proceed to examine how absences respond to changes
in its cost.
Two di⁄erent frameworks are frequently used for such an assessment. The
￿rst framework uses natural experiments in which levels of absenteeism are com-
pared before-and-after some policy change in the way workers are compensated
for absence, usually for sickness reasons.3 The other framework treats absence
decisions as stemming from the usual consumption-leisure utility maximization
model and then proceeds to estimate a structural or reduced-form model of the
determinants of absence.
Johansson and Palme (2002) is a prominent example of the ￿rst strand of
the literature. Using data from the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey (SLLS)
and major reforms of Sweden￿ s replacement program for short-term sickness and
income taxes, they ￿nd signi￿cant impact of economic incentives on absences.
Henrekson and Persson (2004) use aggregate time-series data from the National
Social Insurance Board of Sweden over the 1955-99 period and numerous changes
of the compensation level of sick leave to undercover a signi￿cant relationship
between more generous sick leave policies and levels of absence. Although both
1See Akyeampong (2005) for such an assessment for Canada.
2Heywood and Jirjahn (2004) provide some evidence that ￿rms with teams have lower
absence rates.
3A subset of studies focus on health as a determinants of absence. See for example Ichino
and Moretti (2008), Ose (2005) or Vistnes (1997), .
2of these studies provide convincing evidence that economic incentives matter,
they do not provide details on the magnitude of the impact.
In order to use the second framework, one needs detailed data on the cost
of absence including precise information about the ￿rm￿ s leave policy. Whether
the absent employee receive his full or part of his wage is in the usually unob-
served job contract.4 Therefore, most studies in this strand of the literature
have to rely on data on one or a very small sample of ￿rms where at least part
of the relevant information is present. However, relying on such small samples
increases the concern that the results are be interpreted as establishment spe-
ci￿c.5 Allen (1981) and Dionne and Dostie (2007) are the only two studies using
representative survey data to study this topic.
Allen (1981) starts with the observation that absence can be made costly to
employees through decisions on promotions, merit wage increases, layo⁄s and
the availability of sick leave and attendance bonus. Using the 1972-73 Quality of
Employment Survey (QES) and the availability of paid sick leave as a direct cost
of absence, he ￿nds that if a worker misses 10 days a year, it would take a 21%-
28% net wage increase to reduce his annual absence by one day. Interestingly,
the unavailability of paid sick leave leads to a bigger response of absences to
wage (about twice as large), presumably because absences are more costly in
this later case. However, two data problems with Allen (1981)￿ s results are that
absences were measured over a relatively short period of time (two weeks) and,
more importantly, the QES does not have any information on the hourly wage
rate so that arbitrary assumptions on hours worked are needed to convert yearly
income into some measure of wage.
4This cost might even depend on the reason for the absence. But even if the reason is
given, it is doubtful that it is reported truthfully in all case.
5The numerous examples in this category include Dunn and Youngblood (1986), Barmby,
Orme, and Treble (1991), Wilson and Peel (1991), Drago and Wooden (1992), Delgado and
Kiesner (1997), Barmby (2002), Kauermann and Ortlieb (2004) and Ichino and Riphahn
(2005).
3Dionne and Dostie (2007) examine the determinants of absenteeism using the
Workplace Employee Survey (WES) 1999-2002 from Statistics Canada. While
the WES data is representative and contains adequate information on total
days of absence in the past year and hourly wages, Dionne and Dostie (2007)
only uses proxies to measure the cost of absence. Building on Allen (1981)￿ s
insights, they assume the cost of absenteeism is usually related to an increased
likelihood of being ￿red or being passed up for promotion. Therefore, they settle
on an indicator of the layo⁄ rate and the vacancy rate. These variables are
interpreted as indicating the willingness of the workplace to use layo⁄s as a way
to discipline employees. For example, if the vacancy rate is high, the employer
might be reluctant to ￿re employees even if they misbehave. They also include
measures of the use of incentive pay in the workplace. The absent worker might
be compensated for lost wages due to absence, but it is conceivable that the
probability of receiving merit pay, a share of the pro￿ts or group incentives will
diminish as a result of his absence.
While those proxies work reasonably well in their empirical analysis, it still
would be more useful to have access to more direct measures of the cost of
absence. The main objective of this paper is to provide new evidence on how the
cost of absence a⁄ect labor supply decisions. We use linked employer-employee
data from the Canadian WES 1999-2004. We use a particular feature of the
data by which total absences are divided into three separate categories: sick
paid days, other paid days and unpaid days. This division introduces variations
in the way workers are compensated for absence (the cost of absence) and allows
us to estimate more precisely how variations in such costs a⁄ect absenteeism
decisions.
We also contribute to the literature on econometric models of linked employer-
employee data by estimating simultaneously a Poisson model of the determi-
4nants of each type of absence. This is important since it is likely decisions on
di⁄erent types of absence are taken simultaneously. We also take into account
both unobserved worker and workplace heterogeneity and even allow these to
be correlated across equations. This allows us to determine whether the deter-
minants of absence have the same impact and to examine whether unobserved
characteristics play a similar role on di⁄erent types of absences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by extending the
usual consumption-leisure utility maximization model for comparing the de-
terminants of paid and unpaid absences. Section 3 describes the econometric
model that allows workplace and worker unobserved heterogeneity components
to be correlated across the three estimated equations. The data is described
in Section 4 while the estimation results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
We use the consumption-leisure choice model to study absenteeism decisions
but modify it to explicitly take into account di⁄erent types of absence. Let tc
be the contracted number of work hours and w the wage rate. When, for any
imperfection in the labor market, the wage rate is not equal to the marginal rate
of substitution between leisure and income, the worker may have an incentive
to consume more leisure. He may then be absent from work. Some absenteeism
may be unavoidable such as sick leaves; other may be more related to pure
leisure or other private activities. We are interested in the explicit cost of such
choices and on how workplace and job characteristics a⁄ect these decisions. For
simplicity, we consider two types of absences: paid (tp) and unpaid (tu). Paid
absences have less direct costs for the worker. Both types of absence are also
subject to a penalty (D) for each scheduled work period missed. This penalty
5can be a reduction in the probability of receiving a promotion or even an increase
in the probability of being dismissed (indirect cost of absence). We assume that:




D0i ￿ 0; D00i ￿ 0; Di (0) = 0; i = p;u:
Since the worker does not always know the potential penalty cost when he makes
his decision, we consider the possibility that Di ￿
ti￿
can be a random variable.
We write e Di ￿
ti￿
when this is the case.
We assume that worker maximizes an expected utility function U of con-
sumption (C) and total leisure time (L) when he is making his absence decisions






where P and F are respectively a vector of personal characteristics and a vector
of ￿rm characteristics and E is the expectation operator. Writing R as the
individual non-labor income, the budget constraint can be written as:
~ C = R + w(tc ￿ tu ￿ (1 ￿ s)tp) ￿ e Dp (tp) ￿ e Du (tu) (2)
where w is the wage rate, s is a variable that takes the value of one if the worker
has full leave bene￿ts and less than one otherwise. The penalties variables can
be expressed more explicitly by de￿ning e wu and e wp as the unit costs of being
absent. So we can write e Di ￿
ti￿
= e witi and these costs are random variables
6when the decision on ti is made. We can write the time constraint as:
t ￿ tc ￿ tu ￿ tp ￿ t‘ = 0
where t represents the total amount of time in the period under consideration
and t‘ is pure leisure time. So we can write
L = tp + tu + t‘: (3)
Substitution of (2) and (3) in (1) yields
EU
￿
R + w(tc ￿ tu ￿ (1 ￿ s)tp) ￿ e wutu ￿ e wptp;tp + tu + t‘￿
and di⁄erentiation with respect to tu and tp produces the two ￿rst-order condi-
tions:
(tu) :
E [UL ￿ (w + e wu)UC] = 0 (4)
(tp) :
E [UL ￿ (w(1 ￿ s) + e wp)UC] = 0 (5)
where Uk is the partial derivative of U with respect to k = L;C. We write
Huu;Hpp for the second derivatives of (4) and (5) respectively and H for the
determinant of the second derivatives of the maximization program. Necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for a global maximum are that Hii < 0 and H > 0.
From (4) and (5) we observe that the shadow price (or cost) of time for
absent workers is function of s. When s = 0, tp and tu have equivalent shadow
price but the shadow price of tp decreases as s increases. In the particular case
where full compensation bene￿ts are available (s = 1), the cost of absence is
7reduced to e wp. For equivalent penalty function
￿
~ wi￿
, workers should be absent
more frequently in ￿rms where sick leave is full paid and this reason for absence
should be observed more frequently. This e⁄ect should be even higher when
E (wp) ￿ E (wu) as we may suspect for sick days in many ￿rms.
From the Appendix, we obtain the following comparative static results. We
￿rst observe that @t
i
@R > 0 when L is not an inferior good which is a reason-
able assumption. We also observe that this positive e⁄ect is lower for larger
compensation bene￿ts (or larger s) and decreases as ~ wi decreases. It may even




for absence is low). This income e⁄ect is useful for the
sign of @t
i
@tc > 0. The reader should not forget that the decision about tc is
already done when marginal decision are made about tu and tp. Consequently,
in our model, an increase in tc is similar to a wealth e⁄ect for a given w.
We also obtain that @t
i
@E(wi) is negative for both types of absence when L is
not an inferior good or when proportional risk aversion is uniformly less than
unity. This increase in average penalty e⁄ect becomes ambiguous otherwise.6
One important e⁄ect for the ￿rms is the e⁄ect of a change in the wage rate
on time absent from work. This e⁄ect is ambiguous a priori because income and
substitution e⁄ects operate in opposite directions. Assuming in a ￿rst step the
condition of a downward-sloping absenteeism demand curve, a negative sign is
obtained for unpaid bene￿ts or when s equals zero or is su¢ ciently small for
paid bene￿ts. When s is su¢ ciently high or equal to one (full paid bene￿ts),
the e⁄ect is positive when the income e⁄ect is positive or when leisure is not
an inferior good. But the e⁄ect becomes ambiguous for many values of s and is
subject for empirical investigation.
6For the study of labor supply under uncertainty, see Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1987).












when L is not an inferior good. In the case of tp, when s is presumably equal
or close to one, many comparative statics results become ambiguous and even
obtain counter intuitive e⁄ects.
3 Econometric speci￿cation
3.1 Basic model
In this model, where there is no unobserved heterogeneity, days of absence can
be represented by a Poisson process (see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984);
GouriØroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)). In fact, since absences are recorded
as non-negative integers, modeling such data with a continuous distribution
could lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. Let tijt be the observed number
of days of absenteeism for employee i in ￿rm j at time t. The basic model is





It is typical to introduce unobserved heterogeneity in the Poisson model in a
multiplicative form through ￿ijt when we apply the model to a population of
heterogeneous individuals and workplaces. We use the following parameteriza-
tion for ￿ijt
￿ijt = exp(￿Xijt +  j + ￿ij); (7)
9where Xijt is a vector of demographic characteristics.7 It also includes controls
for time, occupation and industry. The additional parameters  j and ￿ij cap-
ture the impact of unobserved characteristics of the workplace and the worker
respectively.8 These unobserved characteristics are assumed to be orthogonal
to other observed characteristics. We assume both workplace and worker unob-
served heterogeneity to be normally distributed with mean zero. The variance of
 j (￿ ) is identi￿ed by the observation of many workers coming from the same
workplace while identi￿cation of the variance of ￿ij(￿￿) is possible by multiple
observations of the same worker over time.9
Workplace unobserved heterogeneity might proxy for the cost of absence to
the workplace when observed heterogeneity is not su¢ ciently informative. For
example, the cost of absence to the ￿rm might be pretty low if substitute work-
ers are easily available and are as productive as regular workers (Allen (1983)).
Therefore, the econometrician might observe higher absenteeism than in an oth-
erwise identical ￿rm where such substitute workers are not available. From a
statistical point of view, it is necessary to take into account both sources of het-
erogeneity in order to avoid the problem of spurious regressions due to multiple
observations on the same worker over time and the same ￿rm characteristics over
its employees. Unobserved heterogeneity at the worker level might represents
di⁄erent preferences or ethic/motivation levels, or unobserved job characteristics
like the safety of the work environment.
7Dionne and Dostie (2007) show what parametrization of the utility function yields this
empirical speci￿cation.
8Since we do not observe workers over di⁄erent jobs, we cannot distinguish between worker
(individual) and job unobserved heterogeneity.
9Note that this speci￿cation is not subject to the usual objection to the Poisson model
since the inclusion of ￿rm and worker unobserved heterogeneity allows for overdispersion at
both the worker and ￿rm level.
103.2 Correlated model
To take into account the possibility that observed and unobserved character-
istics could have di⁄erent impacts on di⁄erent types of absences, we estimate
separate Poisson models for each type of absence, i.e. sick leave, other paid leave
and unpaid leave. Doing so, we also allow the workplace and worker unobserved
heterogeneity components to be correlated across equations. Estimating the cor-
relation between the di⁄erent types of absence will be informative as to whether
the di⁄erent types of leave are substitutes or complements.
Speci￿cally, add superscript a to equation (6) with a = 1 (sick leave), = 2
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The parameters of the distribution have interesting interpretations. For example
if ￿ 12 is positive, this means that unobserved workplace characteristics that are
associated with more sick leaves are also associated with more other paid leaves.
This speci￿cation entails the estimation of 12 parameters for the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity components. In the results reported below, we
11settle on a slightly less involved speci￿cation where we assume that
 
a
j = ￿a j (11)
￿
a
ij = ￿a￿ij (12)
 j ￿ N(0;1) (13)
￿ij ￿ N(0;1) (14)
This last speci￿cation requires the estimation of 6 parameters (￿a;￿a;a = 1;2;3)
and is a parametrization used by Heckman and Walker (1990) in a di⁄erent
context.
We use maximum likelihood methods to obtain estimates for the parameters,
integrating out the two separate unobserved heterogeneity components. Since
a closed form solution to the integral does not exist, the likelihood is computed
by approximating the normal integral using a numerical integration algorithm
based on Gauss-Hermite Quadrature. This algorithm selects a number of points
and weights such that the weighted points approximate the normal distribution.
4 Data
We use data from the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 1999-2004 con-
ducted by Statistics Canada. The survey is both longitudinal and linked in that
it documents the characteristics of the workers and of the workplaces over time.
The target population for the ￿workplace￿component of the survey is de￿ned
as the collection of all Canadian establishments with paid employees in March
of the year of the survey. The survey, however, does not cover the Yukon, the
Northwest territories and Nunavut. Establishments operating in ￿sheries, agri-
culture and cattle farming are also excluded. For the ￿employee￿component,
the target population is the collection of all employees working, or on paid leave,
12in the workplace target population.
The sample for the workplaces comes from the ￿Business registry￿of Statis-
tics Canada which contains information on every business operating in Canada.
Employees are then sampled from an employees list provided by the selected
workplaces. For every workplace, a maximum of twenty-four employees are se-
lected, and for establishments with less than four employees, all employees are
sampled. In the case of total non-response, respondents are withdrawn entirely
from the survey and sampling weights are recalculated in order to preserve repre-
sentativeness of the sample. WES selects new employees and workplaces in odd
years (at every third year for employees and at every ￿fth year for workplaces).
Individuals who did not work throughout the year are also included but we
control for their limited exposure to the risk of being absent in our regression
framework. However, we drop workers who were absent more than thirty days
of work in the past year.10
Each worker in the sample has been asked the number of days of sick paid
leave, other paid leave and unpaid leave he took in the last year. In most case,
other paid leave are mandated by law and include education leave, disability
leave, bereavement, marriage, jury duty, and union business. Note that other
paid leave does not include vacations, paternity/maternity leave or absence due
to strikes or lock-out.
The rich structure of the data set allows us to control for a variety of factors
determining absenteeism decisions. From the worker questionnaire, we are able
to extract detailed demographic characteristics including measures of health, hu-
man capital, and income from other sources. Moreover, we use detailed explana-
tory variables on the employment contract including wage, contracted hours and
information about working hours ￿ exibility and when these working hours take
place.
10Results are robust to other cuto⁄ points for eliminating outliers.
13From the workplace questionnaire, we are able to construct ￿rm size indi-
cators and build measures of layo⁄ and vacancy rates. Finally, our regressions
include industry (13), occupation (6) and time (6) dummies. Summary sta-
tistics on all explanatory variables are presented in Table 1 for the dependent
variable, Table 2 for the employees and Table 3 for the employers.
Column ￿ All￿ from Table 1 shows an average of 3.5 days of absence per
employee per year or close to a full working week. This number is slightly lower
than other published numbers because of the exclusion of long term absenteeism
from the sample and the exclusion of employees from the public sector where
absenteeism is higher. Not surprisingly, most absences take the form of sick
paid leave representing 43% of all absences. However, more surprisingly, unpaid
leave represents the second biggest contribution to total absences with 36% of
all absences.
The other three columns present similar computations for the subsample of
individuals who reported having at least one day of each type of absence. For
example, conditional on having at least one day of paid sick leave, the average
number of days of paid sick leave is 4.2 days. Quite interestingly, individuals
with some paid sick leave or other paid leave are reporting having also more
other paid leave and paid sick leave respectively than the average individuals
while the opposite is true for individuals who took some unpaid leave. This is
evidence that paid sick leave and other paid leave are substitutes either at the
worker or workplace level.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the same four di⁄erent samples as
Table 1. Comparing the last three columns to the ￿rst one allows us to identify
the characteristics of individuals over represented among absents. For example,
it seems that women are more likely to take any kind of leave but the e⁄ect is
stronger for paid sick leave. Quite interestingly, it appears that some variables
14are associated di⁄erently with unpaid leave than paid leave. Take seniority for
example, where individuals with lower than average seniority are over repre-
sented among individuals with some unpaid leave and individual with higher
than average seniority are over represented among individuals who took some
paid sick leave or other paid leave. The contrast is particularly striking with re-
spect to hourly wages and income from other sources (where lower than average
earners are over-represented among individuals who took some unpaid leave).
Similarly, looking at summary statistics for employers, one can see that
individuals from smaller ￿rms are over represented among people with unpaid
leave and individuals in bigger ￿rms over represented among individuals who
took some paid leave, whether for sickness or other reasons. This might be
because paid leave is unavailable or severly limited to workers in smaller ￿rms.
5 Results
Estimation results are presented in Table 4 where we contrast the determinants
of sick leave, other paid leave and unpaid leave. In all models, the dependent
variable is the total number of days of absence that is reported for the whole
year.11
Predictions of the theoretical model In the ￿rst part of Table 4, we
focus on the predictions of the theoretical model. The most important thing to
note is that the coe¢ cients for wages (w), contracted hours (tc) and income (R)
on paid sick leave and other paid leave have the same sign, but is opposite of
the sign for unpaid leave. Also note that, comparing the estimated coe¢ cients
for paid sick leave and other paid leave, the magnitude of the later is somewhat
higher.
11The structure of the data does not allow us to study episodes of absenteeism.
15All results for unpaid leave are in line with the assumption that leisure is
not an inferior good with one exception, the coe¢ cient of contracted hours. It
seems that the e⁄ect of this variable is not limited to a pure income e⁄ect.
The coe¢ cient on hourly wages for unpaid leave implies an absence elasticity
of about -0.37. This is a surprisingly similar elasticity to the one obtained by
Allen (1981) although we use a completely di⁄erent model and much better
data. The implication is the same though: given the low elasticity, workplace
who want to diminish absenteeism must rely on other mechanisms than wage
increases. This elasticity is even positive for paid leaves. Overall the direct cost
of absenteeism is much lower for paid absence than for unpaid absence.
Our two proxies for the average (indirect) cost of absenteeism are the work-
place￿ s layo⁄ and vacancy rates.12 The coe¢ cient for the vacancy rate has the
expected sign: the higher the vacancy rate, the higher the number of days of
absence for all three types. For the layo⁄ rate, we again observe di⁄erent signs
for paid and unpaid leave.
Comparing these results to Dionne and Dostie (2007) who focus on the
determinants of total days of absence, it seems like their reported coe¢ cients
represent an average of the coe¢ cients shown here. For example, their estimate
of the impact of the wage rate is also negative but much closer to zero. Because
of the many changes in sign for the determinants of paid and unpaid leave, this
suggests that focusing on total absences will yield coe¢ cients biased toward zero
when some absences are paid and others unpaid.
Demographics, health and human capital We again note that many
coe¢ cients have di⁄erent impact on paid and unpaid leave. This is the case for
12In the literature, the cost of absenteeism is usually related to an increased likelihood of
being ￿red or being passed up for promotion. Therefore, we settle on an indicator of the
layo⁄ rate (de￿ned as the number of workers laid o⁄ in the past year divided by average
employment) and the vacancy rate (de￿ned as the number of positions available in the ￿rm
divided by average employment).
16the stock of human capital of the employee: higher levels of education, seniority
or experience are associated with higher numbers of days of paid leave and
lower numbers of days of unpaid leave. The magnitude of the increase in the
number of paid sick leave diminishes however for higher levels of education. It
is even negative for individuals with some higher education. Given the lack of
information in the data, it is hard to conclude to a causal impact of education
on absenteeism. It is possible that individual with some higher education are
sorting into jobs where no sick leave is available. It should be noted though that
good health, as an unambiguous impact, decreasing all types of absence.
The impacts of demographic characteristics are even more ambiguous, ex-
plaining perhaps some contradictory results in the literature. For example, a
women with no pre-school aged kids is more likely to take paid sick leave and
unpaid leave but has less days of other paid leave. Adding pre-school aged kids
increases both sick paid leave and other paid leave but decreases unpaid leave
in the case of men and, surprisingly, decreases all three types of absence in the
case of women. We interpret this as evidence that family responsabilities with
respect to kids are more equally shared among parents than previously found.
Work arrangement and ￿rm size Three workplace characteristics un-
ambiguously raise all types of absence: the compressed workweek, working in
shift and being covered by a collective bargaining agreement. One could have
thought that workers being covered by a collective bargaining agreement would
have access to more paid leave thus lowering the need for unpaid leave but the
results show that while an unionized worker is 15% and 20% more likely to get
one day of paid sick or other paid leave, he is also more than twice as likely
(52%) to take one day of unpaid leave. This seems to indicate a lower indirect
cost of absenteeism.
Finally, we observe that absences increase with ￿rm size but unpaid leave is
17more frequent in smaller workplace whereas other paid leave and especially sick
paid leave is more likely to be observed in large workplaces.
Unobserved heterogeneity The estimated coe¢ cients for the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution are shown in the last panel of Table 4. Remember
that ￿ refers to unobserved workplace heterogeneity and ￿ to unobserved worker
heterogeneity. At the worker level, since all ￿ are positive, this means that all
types of absence are positively correlated: workers who take more paid sick
leave also have more other paid leave and more unpaid leave. This indicates
that there is probably a category of workers who are not very sensitive to the
cost of absence.
However, at the workplace level, we observe a negative correlation between
paid leave (sick or other) and unpaid leave. This means that workplaces with
more paid sick leave also have more other paid leave but lower unpaid leave.
Therefore, while summary statistics indicate that paid and unpaid leaves are
substitutes, estimated correlations show that the substitutability is driven by
the establishment leave policy and not by the worker.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of absence, distinguishing
between three di⁄erent types of absence and using that information to get some
measure of the direct cost of absence to the worker. This paper is one of the
very few articles examining the determinants of absences with survey data and
a precise measure of the cost of absence.
We ￿nd that many workplace, worker or job characteristics have di⁄eren-
tiated impacts on paid and unpaid leave, something that has not been found
before. Unpaid leave follows the usual patterns under the assumption that
18leisure is not an inferior good (positive income e⁄ect and negative wage e⁄ect).
These e⁄ects have opposite signs for paid leave which seems to indicate that
the direct cost of absenteeism is lower for paid absences. Di⁄erent e⁄ects are
also obtained for the layo⁄rate used as one proxy for the indirect cost of absen-
teeism while the e⁄ect is identical for the other proxy, the vacancy rate. Using
an empirical model suitable to linked employer-employee data with workplace
and worker unobserved heterogeneity, we ￿nd that all three types of absence
are positively correlated at the worker level but that paid and unpaid leave are
negatively correlated at the workplace level.
Further work would bene￿t greatly to access to detailed contract informa-
tion. For example, does the employee has access to any paid sick leave and if
so how many days? Does the employee use unpaid leave only when paid leave
is no longer available? Is the worker full compensated for sick leave or does he
receive only a fraction of his wage?
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217 Appendix: Comparative statics of tu and tp
From (4) and (5) we obtain the following second order conditions:
E
￿
ULL + (w + e wu)
2 UCC ￿ 2(w + e wu)UCL
￿
= Huu < 0
E
￿
ULL + (w(1 ￿ s) + e wp)
2 UCC ￿ 2(w(1 ￿ s) + e wp)UCL
￿
= Hpp < 0













= H > 0:




we must ￿rst take the total di⁄erentiation of the ￿rst order conditions:
















from which we obtain the following results by applying the Cramer￿ s rule and








ULC ￿ e witUCC
￿
where
e wpt = w(1 ￿ s) + e wp
and
e wut = w + e wu:
Assuming that leisure is not an inferior good under certainty, @t
u
@R is positive.
22This positive sign may become less important or even negative when s is high
or close to one and for E (wp) ￿ E (wu) for a given ULC.
In this model, tc is considered as exogenous when the worker makes his
decision about ti. So the e⁄ect of @t
i






ULC ￿ e witUCC
￿
w:







￿(1 ￿ s)UC +
￿
ULC ￿ e wptUCC
￿
(tc ￿ (1 ￿ s)tp ￿ tu)
￿
which is negative under normal conditions of positive labor supply curve and
when s = 0. When s is su¢ ciently high or equal to one (full paid bene￿ts), the
e⁄ect is positive when the income e⁄ect is positive. The e⁄ect becomes ambigu-
ous for many values of s and is a subject matter for empirical investigation.
Finally, we may be interested to verify how an increase in the expected
penalty may a⁄ect the ti decisions. The sign of @t
i
@E(wi) is the same as that of
@t
i








ULC ￿ e witUCC
￿
ti￿
and is negative under the assumption that L is not an inferior good but becomes














So we obtain the same result if proportional risk aversion is uniformly less than
unity. This result is not without link with the su¢ cient condition for having a
23reduction in the optimal risk exposure following a ￿rst order deterioration in the
random variable. It should be note, however, that a ￿rst-order deterioration in
the random variable implies a decrease in its expected value while the contrary
































































































































































































































































































































25Table 2: Summary statistics - Employee
All Sick Other Unpaid
Demographic characteristics
Women 0.518 0.589 0.535 0.546
Black 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012
Other race 0.301 0.308 0.273 0.274
Married 0.559 0.584 0.61 0.471
Number of pre-school aged kids 0.238 0.255 0.238 0.23
Health
No activity limitation 0.611 0.586 0.581 0.603
Human Capital
High school degree 0.171 0.141 0.139 0.179
Certi￿cate 0.137 0.119 0.14 0.159
Less than bachelor degree 0.397 0.434 0.412 0.409
Bachelor degree 0.13 0.171 0.159 0.09
Some higher education 0.059 0.075 0.079 0.03
Seniority 8.809 9.897 10.051 6.957
Experience 17.023 17.663 18.194 14.187
Income
Income from other sources (000s) 2.401 2.671 2.538 2.06
Wage Contract
Natural logarithm of hourly wage 2.841 2.973 2.981 2.664
Contracted hours 36.554 37.626 37.738 34.857
Work arrangement
Works regular hours 0.117 0.06 0.081 0.151
Usual workweek includes Sat. and Sun. 0.206 0.125 0.147 0.285
Work ￿ exible hours 0.366 0.331 0.346 0.346
Does not work MtoF between 6am & 6pm 0.613 0.723 0.694 0.488
Some work done at home 0.245 0.294 0.304 0.13
Work some rotating shift 0.069 0.07 0.085 0.082
Work on a reduced workweek 0.068 0.043 0.052 0.105
Work on compressed work week schedule 0.053 0.047 0.058 0.063
Covered by a CBA 0.257 0.327 0.349 0.301
26Table 3: Summary statistics - Workplace
All Sick Other Unpaid
Cost of absenteeism E(wa)
Vacancy rate 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019
Layo⁄ rate 0.083 0.064 0.066 0.090
Size
20-99 employees 0.309 0.289 0.278 0.338
100-499 employees 0.204 0.246 0.255 0.207
500 employees and more 0.165 0.235 0.229 0.136
#Observations 109,289 42,568 19,920 18,646
Table 4: Simultaneous Poisson regressions on days of absence
Sick Other paid Unpaid
Variables from the theoretical model
Natural log. of hourly wage (w) 0.056 *** 0.148 *** -0.366 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Contracted hours (tc) 0.016 *** 0.021 *** -0.006 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Income from -0.002 *** -0.001 *** 0.002 ***
other sources (000s) (R) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cost of absenteeism (E(wa))
Layo⁄ Rate -0.012 *** -0.022 *** 0.004 **
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Vacancy Rate 0.075 *** 0.241 *** 0.219 ***
(0.024) (0.036) (0.028)
Statistical signi￿cance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
27Table 4: Cont￿ d
Sick Other paid Unpaid
Demographic characteristics
Women 0.251 *** -0.030 *** 0.065 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Black 0.012 -0.046 ** -0.007
(0.013) (0.020) (0.023)
Other race 0.028 *** -0.103 *** -0.096 ***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Married -0.091 *** 0.022 *** -0.010 **
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Number of pre-school aged kids 0.068 *** 0.014 *** -0.010 **
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Women * pre-school aged kids -0.016 *** -0.172 *** -0.093 ***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Health
No activity limitation -0.365 *** -0.102 *** -0.265 ***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Human Capital
High school degree 0.043 *** 0.185 *** -0.035 ***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Certi￿cate 0.074 *** 0.250 *** 0.136 ***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Less than bachelor degree 0.102 *** 0.209 *** 0.023 ***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Bachelor degree 0.015 ** 0.039 *** -0.204 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Some higher education -0.190 *** -0.015 -0.289 ***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.014)
Seniority 0.047 *** 0.034 *** -0.027 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Seniority squared (/100) -0.129 *** -0.098 *** 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Experience 0.006 *** 0.015 *** -0.031 ***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Experience squared (/100) -0.019 *** -0.045 *** 0.032 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Statistical signi￿cance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
28Table 4: Cont￿ d
Sick Other paid Unpaid
Work arrangement
Work regular hours -0.337 *** -0.203 *** 0.197 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Work on weekend -0.110 *** -0.118 *** 0.011 **
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Work ￿ exible hours -0.056 *** 0.018 *** 0.083 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Work non traditional working hours 0.178 *** 0.154 *** -0.133 ***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Work at home -0.025 *** 0.176 *** -0.227 ***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Work in shift 0.220 *** 0.204 *** 0.011 *
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Work on a reduced workweek -0.150 *** -0.162 *** 0.216 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Work on compressed workweek 0.075 *** 0.136 *** 0.028 ***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Covered by a CBA 0.151 *** 0.207 *** 0.520 ***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm Size
20-99 employees 0.324 *** 0.230 *** 0.137 ***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
100-499 employees 0.519 *** 0.351 *** 0.046 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
500 employees and more 0.647 *** 0.415 *** -0.074 ***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant and unobserved heterogeneity parameters
Constant -2.169 *** -3.772 *** -0.638 ***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.028)
￿ 0.556 *** 0.348 *** -0.842 ***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
￿ 0.688 *** 1.230 *** 1.749 ***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Industry dummies YES YES YES
Occupation dummies YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES
ln-likelihood -529,420.07
#observations 109,289
Statistical signi￿cance: *=10%; **=5%; ***=1%.
Robust standard error in parantheses
29